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A  P u b l i c a t i o n  b y  K A T Z   &   S T O N E ,  L . L . P .
Construction Newsletter

DELAWARE FEDERAL COURT LIMITS USE OF
CONSTRUCTIVE TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE;
LOOKS TO COMMON LAW ON CONTRACT DAMAGES

In the recent case of Donald M. Durkin Contr. Inc. v. City of Newark, et. al., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68417, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware refused to apply the doctrine of “constructive termination for convenience” in favor of Defendant City of Newark (“City”). City entered into a contract with a general contractor (the “Contractor”) for construction of a water reservoir. City breached the contract, admitting that it terminated the contract without providing the Contractor seven days notice as required by the contract. City argued that the court should apply the doctrine of constructive termination for convenience as the appropriate way to calculate damages for its breach.

Constructive termination for convenience is an outgrowth of termination for convenience doctrine, a judicially created concept originally developed to limit damages when government entities breach a contract. Under this doctrine, the breaching government entity is responsible only (a) for costs incurred by the contractor, (b) for profit based on work already done, and (c) for costs of preparing the termination settlement proposal. In other words, the doctrine awards no expectancy damages for the contractor as would be provided in an ordinary breach of contract situation.

Applied constructively, the doctrine allows government entities to retroactively justify a breach. The government entity may defend itself in a breach of contract action on the ground that a valid justification for nonperformance existed at the time of the breach, though the government had no knowledge of the ground at the time of breach. In practice, the doctrine serves to limit the amount of damages available to contractors.

In Durkin, the court considered City’s breach an improper termination because, while City had the right under the contract to terminate at any time for any reason, it did not follow the notice procedures required by the contract. The contract contained provisions spelling out the specific measure of damages for proper termination, but was silent on damages for improper termination. The Court awarded Contractor $11.6 million in damages on its breach of contract claim pursuant to Contractor’s own calculation of damages.

On a Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for a New Trial, City argued that its breach should be construed as a constructive termination for convenience. The court held that, because a clause specified limited damages in situations where City properly terminated the contract and not in situations where City improperly terminated, City’s failure to properly terminate the contract precluded its limiting of damages.

Durkin is important in that it highlights for contractors and government entities the importance of defining the scope of damages available in all possible breach situations. The difference in recovery based on constructive termination for convenience versus damages based on a contract provision versus damages based simply on common law contract principles can be significant. It is therefore vital for contracting parties to carefully negotiate the measure of damages applicable to every possible breach contingency.

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