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A  P u b l i c a t i o n  b y  K A T Z   &   S T O N E ,  L . L . P .
Construction Newsletter

ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES:
HOW VAGUE IS TOO VAGUE?

Although the common law presumes that contractual disputes will be resolved through litigation, many in the construction industry sign contracts under which the parties agree to resolve their disputes through binding arbitration. Although arbitration certainly has its advantages (i.e., the arbitrator is usually familiar with the industry and associated terminology), some general contractors draft subcontracts with language making arbitration optional at the discretion of the general contractor. In Wolverine Fire Protection Co. v. Atlantic Marine Construction Co., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33785 (E.D.Va. 2008), the subcontractor challenged the enforceability of such a contractual provision, arguing that the arbitration provision was too vague to be enforceable.

In Wolverine Fire Protection Co., the subcontractor provided the general contractor with fire protection equipment and other associated products. A dispute arose as to billing and, following demand for payment, the subcontractor filed suit against the general contractor, claiming breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The general contractor, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss, seeking to enforce an arbitration provision in the contract. Specifically, the arbitration provision provided, in relevant part, “At sole discretion of [general contractor], claims…may be arbitrated.” The clause continued, “If [general contractor] determines that resolution of any dispute between the [s] ubcontractor and [general contractor] shall be made in such manner, litigation…shall not be permitted.”

The general contractor, in making the motion to compel arbitration, argued that, insofar as it elected to arbitrate the subcontractor’s dispute, proceeding with litigation would be inappropriate. The subcontractor argued that the court should not enforce the arbitration provision because the clause “is too vague and indefinite, in that it does not prescribe a location, a number of arbitrators, procedural rules, or any enforcement mechanism for an arbitration.”

The court noted that the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) “establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” In other words, the issue before the court was whether an arbitration provision exists, not whether the arbitration clause is enforceable.

The enforceability of an arbitration provision is an issue often left to the arbitrator to decide.

The court further observed that the FAA operates to provide arbitration terms if the contract is silent on this issue. Accordingly, the court rejected the subcontractor’s contention that the lack of definite location, number of arbitrators, procedural rules, or enforcement mechanism rendered the arbitration provision too vague and indefinite to enforce.

The court, therefore, focused solely on whether the clause cited by the general contractor amounted to an agreement to arbitrate. The court found particularly persuasive an unpublished opinion from another jurisdiction holding “that the phrase ‘arbitration clause,’ standing alone in a reinsurance contract was enough to bind the parties to arbitration.” Accordingly, the court granted the general contractor’s motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that, if arbitration could be compelled by the simple phrase “arbitration clause,” so too should the instant arbitration provision be enforced.

The lesson of Wolverine Fire Protection Co. is that subcontractors should be cognizant of the dispute resolution provisions in their contracts, as even an arguably vague or indefinite arbitration provision will likely be enforced by courts. Additionally, if faced with a contract under which the general contractor is provided the discretion to elect arbitration in lieu of litigation, an aggrieved subcontractor should communicate with the general contractor regarding the general contractor’s preferences for dispute resolution prior to incurring the cost of initiating litigation or arbitration.

                         
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The contractor also argued that the equipment idle time change order was not valid because it was not in writing, as required by the subcontract. The court, however, noted that a non-modification provision in a written contract, stating that the contract may be modified only by a writing signed by the parties, can, like any other provisions in a contract, be expressly or impliedly waived. The court found that the contractor waived that provision of the subcontract when it made the oral equipment idle time agreement with the subcontractor. As a result, the oral equipment idle time change order was binding on the contractor, even though the original subcontract stated that change orders must be in writing.

In re R&D Contr., L.L.C. is instructive for two reasons. First, the court held that a contractor would be bound by the actions of its agents, even when its agent issues an oral change order in contravention of the terms of the written subcontract. Second, the court held that a contractual provision requiring that changes be in writing, itself, can be waived orally. This case suggests a cautionary approach to the delegation of authority and to the issuance of oral directives.

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